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Context
• The generation, flow, and use of nuclear materials is essential 
to international security and is a fundamental compelling and 
enduring mission of DOE/NNSA
• Nuclear material activities and threats are “global” and 
continue to expand
• U.S. homeland security requires global nuclear materials 
management - globally integrated defense-in-depth
• An overarching concept is needed to address existing legacy 
nuclear/radiological materials and transition towards a nuclear 
energy future, while strengthening the global nonproliferation 
regime 
• An consistent framework would help achieve an integrated 
and global view to help direct the USG technology 
development and complementary policy strategies
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Systems Approach to Connect Global 
Objectives and Local Actions 
• Articulate global objectives into a hierarchy of subsystem 
requirements and local attributes and measures
• Establish a baseline system and viable alternatives 
through the interactions and relationships (e.g., networks) 
of local system elements and their options
• Evaluate performance of system alternatives and develop 
improved nuclear material management strategies and 
technologies
• The need to address greatest concerns first (prioritized or 
graded approach) and to make tradeoffs among 
implementation options and competing objectives entails 
a risk-based approach
Particular interest in navigating the transition from 
nuclear material legacy -- through present-day --
to emerging nuclear future
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Integrated Global Nuclear Materials 
Management (IGNMM)
• IGNMM could provide a systematic understanding of global 
nuclear materials management and evolutionarily improve and 
integrate the management through an active architecture, using 
for example, situation awareness, system models, methods, 
technologies, and international cooperation
• Different tools would be used within the overall framework to 
address individual issues on the desired geographic scale that 
could be easily linked to broader analyses
• Life-cycle system analyses would allow for evaluating material 
path alternatives on an integrated global scale
• Disconnects, overlaps, technical options, and alternatives for 
optimizing nuclear materials processes could be evaluated in 
an integrated manner
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• We need strategies to manage nuclear material network 
risks, for example:
— If security is to be achieved through redundancy, the 
redundant devices should be diverse
— Diversity: identify sources of correlated faults, and utilize 
security elements not susceptible to those sources
— Decentralization and decoupling: protecting critical 
elements by isolating them may make them more 
vulnerable if their isolation can not be guaranteed
— It may pay to search for effective ways to reduce 
propagating events at the cost of other benefits or 
efficiencies (e.g., operations)
• Institutional controls that act as ‘safety switches’
• Build in more tolerance for lower risks to achieve less 
tolerance for higher risks (e.g., performance based regulatory 
and control regimes)
Manage the Risks
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IGNMM Activities May Be Viewed as 
a Complex Network
• Complex, decentralized networks are common: consist of 
nodes of activity with links among the nodes
— The Worldwide Web
— Transport routes among US cities
— Distribution supply to Wal-Mart
— Global oil and steel enterprises
— Source, movement, and use of nuclear materials
• The research challenge is to anticipate where and how 
security failures can occur in a dynamic nuclear material 
network and how to prevent them
— Complexity entails that the usual system analysis approach 
of partitioning components can miss important behaviors: 
prior events can effect unexpected subsequent behavior 
(e.g., legacy materials and terrorism)
— Uncertainty: there are too many scenarios to use that 
approach, so how do you manage system uncertainties?
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• Need to understand the network system risks
— Man-made networks exhibit distributions of performance 
fluctuations at nodes and along links
• Implies likelihood and magnitude of variances in security may be
predictable 
• Implies catastrophic events are inevitable; but likelihood can be 
reduced by design
— Highly interactive network elements can lead to large 
vulnerabilities and failures
• Vulnerabilities in a network system
— Independent events (e.g., site reactor operations)
— Correlated or common mode events (e.g., inherent 
vulnerabilities in similar process facilities or transportation 
modes)
— Propagating events (e.g., incremental diversion of materials 
or technology to bad actors)
— Attacks or deliberate failures: exploit some vulnerability in a 
surprising new way (e.g, clandestine program among more 
than one monitored state)
Risks and Vulnerabilities
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Some Key Issues
• Defense-in-depth - address all phases of nuclear material-related 
risks
—Securing and safeguarding source material
—Detection and tracking material movement and processes
—Interdiction and response to undesirable events 
—Diversity in prevention and mitigation approaches and measures
—Reducing attractiveness of fuel materials and process streams for 
weapons-usability
• Test management strategies using systematic assessment of 
risks vs. investments
—Developing technical and institutional options to increase barriers 
to proliferation
—Which technologies and systems should be deployed and where?
—What new capabilities are needed to address challenges?
—How can we work most effectively in international cooperation?
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Proliferation Resistance of Emerging Generation 
of Nuclear Energy Fuel Cycles 
• Starting with a basis of nuclear materials inventory, 
movements and security, this framework can be used in 
evaluating proliferation resistance of possible fuel cycle 
options
• Established or evolving methodologies would be used to 
evaluate options (e.g., PR & PP)
• PR & PP evaluation measures include: 
— Quantity, attractiveness, and accessibility of weapons-
usable materials
— Potential for delays in or detection of weapon production 
activity
• Improved IGNMM performance requires constant iteration 
among situation awareness, assessment of the risk 
landscape, and developing better management strategies
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Examples of S&T thrusts and 
cross-cutting capabilities
• System and risk sciences for complex, decentralized 
networks
• Identification of diversion of nuclear material
— Improving nuclear security
—Nuclear latency management and the world’s future 
nuclear control regime (e.g., up-to-date situational 
awareness of high-risk material inventory & location)
—Quantify margins of uncertainty
—Near-real-time warning and incident characterization 
—New material forms and technologies for surety of 
anticipated nuclear technology developments
• Bridging the knowledge gap between S&T and policy 
development and implementation
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S&T capabilities to be applied
• Information acquisition, data management, simulation 
and modeling, and decision support 
• System and risk sciences for complex, decentralized 
networks of activities
• Material forms, technologies, and behaviors for surety of 
anticipated nuclear technology developments
• Enhanced detection and monitoring technologies and 
practices
• International collaborations on nuclear management 
issues and control regimes
• Data integration and optimal user interface
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Example Payoffs
• Propagate best and improved material control programs 
and practices 
— Master material management plans
— Reduction and consolidation of material inventories
• Transportation security under new governance regimes
• Optimized disposition paths and end-states
• Better understanding of latency management or 
proliferation plausibility
• More effective regional security measures and cooperation
• Support or effective future nuclear fuel cycle regimes 
